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Abstract
We develop a graphical 3-equation New Keynesian model for macroeconomic analysis to
replace the traditional IS-LM-AS model. The new graphical IS-PC-MR model is a simple version
of the one commonly used by central banks and captures the forward-looking thinking engaged in
by the policy maker. Within a common framework, we compare our model to other monetary-rule
based models that are used for teaching and policy analysis. We show that the differences among
the models centre on whether the central bank optimizes and on the lag structure in the IS and
Phillips curve equations. We highlight the analytical and pedagogical advantages of our preferred
model. The model can be used to analyze the consequences of a wide range of macroeconomic
shocks, to identify the structural determinants of the coefﬁcients of a Taylor type interest rate rule,
and to explain the origin and size of inﬂation bias.
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Much of modern macroeconomics is inaccessible to undergraduates and to non-
specialists. There is a gulf between the simple models found in principles and in-
termediate macro textbooks — notably, the IS-LM-AS approach — and the models
currently at the heart of the debates in monetary macroeconomics in academic and
central bank circles that are taught in graduate courses. Our aim is to show how this
divide can be bridged.
Modern monetary macroeconomics is based on what is increasingly known as
the 3-equation New Keynesian model: IS curve, Phillips curve and a monetary pol-
icy rule equation. This is the basic analytical structure of Michael Woodford’s book
Interest and Prices published in 2003 and, for example, of the widely cited paper
‘The New Keynesian Science of Monetary Policy’ by Clarida et al. (1999). An ear-
lier inﬂuential paper is Goodfriend and King (1997). These authors are concerned
to show how the equations can be derived from explicit optimizing behaviour on
the part of the individual agents in the economy in the presence of some nominal
imperfections. Moreover, “[t]his is in fact the approach already taken in many of
the econometric models used for policy simulations within central banks or inter-
national institutions” (Woodford, 2003, p. 237).
Our contribution is to develop a version of the 3-equation model that can be
taught to undergraduate students and can be deployed to analyze a broad range of
policyissues. It can betaughtusingdiagramsand minimal algebra. TheIS diagram
is placed vertically above the Phillips diagram, with the monetary rule shown in
the latter along with the Phillips curves. We believe that our IS-PC-MR graphical
analysis is particularly useful for explaining the optimizing behaviour of the central
bank. Users can see and remember readily where the key relationships come from
and are therefore able to vary the assumptions about the behaviour of the policy-
maker or the private sector. In order to use the model, it is necessary to think about
the economics behind the processes of adjustment. One of the reasons IS-LM-AS
got a bad name is that it too frequently became an exercise in mechanical curve-
shifting: students were often unable to explain the economic processes involved
in moving from one equilibrium to another. In the framework presented here, in
order to work through the adjustment process, the student has to engage in the same
forward-looking thinking as the policy-maker.
The model weproposefor teaching purposes is New Keynesian in its 3-equation
structure and its modelling of a forward-looking optimizing central bank. How-
ever it does not incorporate either a forward-looking IS curve or a forward-looking
Phillips curve.1
1Both extensions are provided in Chapter 15 of Carlin and Soskice (2006).
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ern macroeconomics can be presented to undergraduates. His alternative to the
standard IS-LM-AS framework follows earlier work by Taylor (1993) in which in-
stead of the LM curve, there is an interest rate based monetary policy rule.2 In
Section 2, we motivate the paper by providing a common framework within which
several models can be compared. The common framework consists of an IS equa-
tion, a Phillips curve equation and a monetary rule. We shall see that the differences
among the models centre on (a) whether the monetary rule is derived from optimiz-
ing behaviour and (b) the lag structure in the IS curve and in the Phillips curve.
Using the common framework, we highlight the analytical and pedagogical
shortcomings of the Romer–Taylor and Walsh (2002) models and indicate how our
model (which we call the Carlin–Soskice or C–S model) overcomes them. In the
ﬁnal part of Section 2 we show how the very similar models of Svensson (1997)
and Ball (1999) ﬁt into the common framework. The Svensson–Ball model is not
designed for teaching purposes but ﬁts the reality of contemporary central banks
better.
In Section 3, we show how our preferred 3-equation model (the C–S model) can
be taught to undergraduates. This is done both in equations and in diagrams. We
begin by describing how a diagram can be used to illustrate the way an IS shock
affects the economy and how the central bank responds so as to steer the economy
back to its inﬂation target. We also analyze inﬂation and supply-side shocks. We
discuss how variations in the structural characteristics of the economy both on the
demandandthesupplysideand inthecentralbank’spreferences, arereﬂected inthe
behaviour of the economy and of the central bank following a shock. In the ﬁnal
part of Section 3, we show that by adopting the Svensson–Ball lag structure, the
central bank’s interest rate rule takes the form of the familiar Taylor rule in which
the central bank reacts to contemporaneous deviations of inﬂation from target and
output from equilibrium. In Section 4, we show how the problems of inﬂation bias
and time inconsistency can be analyzed using the 3-equation model.
2 Motivation
Two signiﬁcant attempts to develop a 3-equation IS-PC-MR model to explain mod-
ernmacroeconomicsdiagrammaticallytoanundergraduateaudiencearetheRomer–
Taylor (R–T) and the Walsh models. While both are in different ways attractive,
they also suffer from drawbacks—either expositional or as useful models of the
real world. We set out these two models within a common 3 equation framework
2Other presentations of ‘macroeconomics without the LM’ can be found in Allsopp and Vines
(2000), Taylor (2000) and Walsh (2002).
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drawbacks are avoided. The deﬁning differences between the models lie in the lags
from the interest rate to output and from output to inﬂation. We also use the frame-
work to set out the Svensson–Ball model. Although in our view the lag structure
of the Svensson–Ball model best ﬁts the real world, it is—even when simpliﬁed
—signiﬁcantly harder to explain to an undergraduate audience than our preferred
C–S model.
The common framework involves a simpliﬁcation in the way the central bank’s
loss function is treated. We propose a short-cut that enables us to avoid the com-
plexity of minimizing the central bank’s full (inﬁnite horizon) loss function whilst
retaining the insights that come from incorporating an optimizing forward-looking
central bank in the model.
As shown in Section 2.1, all four models share a 3-equation structure — an
IS equation, a Phillips relation and a monetary rule equation. The key differences
between the models lie in whether there is an optimizing central bank and in two
critical lags.3 The ﬁrst is in the IS equation from the interest rate to output, and
the second is in the Phillips equation from output to inﬂation. In fact the four
possiblecombinationsofazerooroneyearlagintheIS equationandinthePhillips
equation more or less deﬁne the four models. After explaining the framework, the
four models are set out in order: the Romer–Taylor model initially without and then
with central bank optimization; the Walsh model; the Carlin–Soskice model; and
the simpliﬁed Svensson–Ball model.
2.1 Common framework
The IS equation. It is convenient to work with deviations of output from equilib-
rium, xt ≡ yt − ye, where y is output and ye is equilibrium output. Thus the IS
equation of yt = At − art−i, where At is exogenous demand and rt−i is the real
interest rate, becomes
xt = (At − ye) − art−i, (IS equation)
where
i = 0,1
captures the lag from the real interest rate to output (a period represents a year).
Once central bank optimization is introduced, we shall generally replace At − ye
by arS,t where rS,t is the so-called ‘stabilizing’ or Wicksellian (Woodford) rate of
interest such that output is in equilibrium when rS,t = rt−i.
3As we shallsee, the Walsh model also assumes a different timing structure for the central bank’s
knowledge about shocks.
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is common in much of this literature, that the inﬂation process is inertial so that
current inﬂation is a function of lagged inﬂation and the output gap, i.e.
πt = πt−1 + αxt−j, (Phillips curve)
where
j = 0,1
is the lag from output to inﬂation.
The monetary rule. The monetary rule equation can be expressed in two ways.
On the one hand, it can be expressed as an interest rate rule indicating how the
current real interest rate should be set in response to the current inﬂation rate (and
sometimes in response to the current output gap as well, as in the famous Taylor
rule). We shall call this form of the monetary rule the interest rate rule or IR equa-
tion. Alternatively, the monetary rule can be in the form that shows how output
(chosen by the central bank through its interest rate decision) should respond to in-
ﬂation (or, as will be seen, to forecast inﬂation). We call this the MR–AD equation
and it is shown as a downward sloping line in the Phillips curve diagram. Either
form of the monetary rule can be derived from the other. It is usual to derive the
MR–AD equation from the minimization by the central bank of a loss function,
and then (if desired) to derive the interest rate rule from the MR–AD equation. We
shall follow that practice here. It will be assumed that the loss in any period t is
written x2
t + βπ2
t, so that the output target is equilibrium output and the inﬂation
target πT is set equal to zero for simplicity. In Section 4, we relax the assumption
that the output target is equilibrium output. The central bank in period t (the period
t CB for short) has the discretion to choose the current short-term real interest rate
rt, just as the period t + n CB has the discretion to choose rt+n.
For a graduate audience the standard approach to the central bank’s problem is
to use dynamic optimization techniques to show how the period t CB minimizes the
present value loss, Lt,
Lt =
￿
x
2
t + βπ
2
t
￿
+ δ
￿
x
2
t+1 + βπ
2
t+1
￿
+ δ
2 ￿
x
2
t+2 + βπ
2
t+2
￿
+ ...,
where δ is the discount factor with 0 < δ < 1. Showing this rigorously is beyond
the scope of undergraduate courses. We believe, however, that it is important to
see the central bank as an optimizing agent who needs to think through the future
consequences of its current decisions and hence engage in forecasting. We have
found in teaching undergraduates that a useful compromise approach is therefore
to assume that the period t CB minimizes those terms in the loss function Lt that it
affects directly via its choice of rt. Thus, neglecting random shocks that it cannot
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simpliﬁed procedure, the period t CB minimizes
L = x
2
t + βπ
2
t, when i = j = 0 (Walsh)
L = x
2
t + δβπ
2
t+1, when i = 0, j = 1 (Romer–Taylor)
L = x
2
t+1 + βπ
2
t+1, when i = 1, j = 0 (Carlin–Soskice)
L = x
2
t+1 + δβπ
2
t+2, when i = j = 1, (Svensson–Ball)
(Central Bank loss functions)
whereeachlossfunctionislabelledbythenameofthemodelwiththeassociatedlag
structure, as we shall explain in the subsections to follow. If these loss functions are
minimized with respect to xt+i subject to the relevant Phillips curve, the resulting
MR–AD equations are
xt = −αβπt, when i = j = 0 (Walsh)
xt = −δαβπt+1, when i = 0, j = 1 (Romer–Taylor)
xt+1 = −αβπt+1, when i = 1, j = 0 (Carlin–Soskice)
xt+1 = −δαβ πt+2, when i = j = 1. (Svensson–Ball)
(MR–AD equations)
Note that the MR–AD equations require that the central bank forecasts the relevant
inﬂation rate using the Phillips curve. We show in the subsequent sub-sections how
the interest rate rule equations are derived.
Aside from the teaching beneﬁt, there are two further justiﬁcations for our way
of simplifying the central bank’s problem. First, the MR–AD equations have the
same form as in the dynamic optimization case. To take an example, i = j = 1
corresponds to the lag structure of the Svensson–Ball model. The MR–AD equa-
tion shown above and in the full Svensson–Ball model with dynamic optimization
is of the form xt+1 = −θπt+2. The difference between the two is of course that the
slope of the inﬂation-output relation here is too steep since our procedure takes no
account of the beneﬁcial effect of a lower πt+2 in reducing future losses. Thus in
comparison to the equation above, xt+1 = −δαβ πt+2, the corresponding equation
in Svensson (1997) is xt+1 = −δαβk πt+2 (equation B.7, p.1143) where k ≥ 1 is
the marginal value of π2
t+2 in the indirect loss function V (πt+2) (equation B.6).
A second justiﬁcation for this procedure (again, taking the case of the i = j =
1 lag structure) comes from the practice of the Bank of England. As we shall
see below, the Bank of England believes the i = j = 1 lag structure is a good
approximation to reality. And in consequence it uses, at time t, the rate of inﬂation
πt+2 as its forecast target. This comes close to the period t CB minimizing the loss
function L = x2
t+1 + δβπ2
t+2.
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The attraction of the R–T model is its simplicity and ease of diagrammatic expla-
nation. Since i = 0 and j = 1, the IS and PC equations are
xt = −a(rt − rS,t) (IS equation)
πt = πt−1 + αxt−1. (PC equation)
Instead of assuming that the central bank optimizes in choosing its interest rate rule,
the R–T model assumes an interest rate rule of the form
rt = γπt. (IR equation)
Theinterestrateformofthemonetaryrulemaybeeasilychangedinto arelationship
between xt and πt by substituting the IR equation into the IS equation to get
xt = arS,t − aγπt, (AD equation)
which is a downward sloping line in the Phillips curve diagram. With arS,t =
At − ye = 0, the AD equation goes through (x = 0, π = πT = 0). A permanent
positive aggregate demand shock implies that At > ye and so rS,t > 0, which shifts
the curve up permanently.
Equilibrium. The equilibrium of the model is easily derived. Stable inﬂation
requires output at equilibrium, i.e. x = 0. This implies from the AD equation that
the inﬂation rate at equilibrium, πe, is as follows:
πe = rS,t/γ = (At − ye)/aγ.
Thus in this model inﬂation at the constant inﬂation equilibrium differs from the
inﬂation target whenever At  = ye.
Adjustment to equilibrium. The lag structure of the model makes it particularly
simple to follow the consequences of a demand shock. The demand shock in t
raises output in t without initially affecting inﬂation since inﬂation responds to last
period’s output. Since the interest rate only responds to inﬂation, the period t CB
does not respond to the demand shock in period t. In period t+1, inﬂation increases
as a lagged response to the increased output in t; the period t+1 CB increases rt+1
and hence reduces xt+1. This then reduces inﬂation in t + 2, and so on.
Drawbacks. Appealing though the simplicity of the model is, it has three draw-
backs:
1. The interest rate rule is not chosen through optimizing behaviour by the cen-
tral bank.
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Figure 1: Adjustment to a permanent aggregate demand shock: R–T model
2. Since πe = (At − ye)/aγ, then if At − ye > 0, inﬂation in equilibrium is
above the target, i.e. πe > πT and conversely for A − ye < 0, inﬂation in
equilibrium is below the target, πe < πT.4
3. If the slope of the Phillips curve α is less than the absolute value of the slope
of the AD curve, 1/aγ, and if the economy starts from π0 = 0, then for the
initial demand-induced increase in inﬂation, π1, π1 < πe. Thus the tighter
monetary policy will push inﬂation up from π1 to πe. This is because π1 =
α(A − ye) while πe = (A − ye)/aγ.
Problems 2 and 3 are illustrated in the Fig. 1. Problem 2 arises because πe is
determined by the intersection of the AD curve with the long-run vertical Phillips
4This simple model may, however, be appropriate for a setting in which the central bank has
not adopted explicit inﬂation targeting, as is the case for the US over recent decades: inﬂation is
allowed to drift up and down in response to shocks. In support of this, Gürkaynak et al. (2005) ﬁnd
that long-run inﬂation expectations exhibit highly signiﬁcant responses to economic news in the US
and also in the UK before (but not after) the Bank of England adopted an inﬂation target.
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above 0 to point Z in the case of the solid AD and to point Z∗ in the case of the
dashed AD∗. Problem 3 is straightforward to see in the diagram: the initial demand
induced inﬂation, π1, is equal to A−ye multiplied by the Phillips curve coefﬁcient,
α (point B in Fig. 1). The equilibrium rate of inﬂation as a result of the demand
shock is given by A − ye multiplied by the coefﬁcient from the AD curve, 1/aγ.
Hence, in the case of the AD curve shown by the solid line in Fig. 1, α < 1/aγ,
so that πe > π1 and the economy adjusts with rising inﬂation to tighter monetary
policy. With the dashed AD curve α > 1/aγ, which implies that π∗
e < π1.5
2.3 The R–T model with central bank optimization
If the central bank chooses the monetary rule optimally, all three problems disap-
pear. Remember that in the R–T model with the lag structure i = 0, j = 1, the
central bank minimizes the loss function, L = x2
t +δβπt+1
2, subject to the Phillips
curve, πt+1 = πt + αxt, which implies the MR–AD equation derived in Section
2.1:
xt = −δαβπt+1. (MR–AD equation)
The interest rate rule is derived from this as follows. Since πt+1 = πt + αxt, the
MR–AD equation can be rewritten xt = −
δαβ
1+δα2βπt. Using the IS equation, the
optimized interest rule is then
rt − rS,t =
δαβ
a(1 + δα2β)
πt = γπt, (IR equation)
where γ ≡
δαβ
a(1+δα2β).
Once central bank optimization is introduced, the MR–AD curve replaces the
AD curve and exogenous demand does not shift it. In equilibrium therefore πe =
πT, so that drawback 2 above disappears. So too does the third drawback 3, since
πt+1 = πT + αarS,t > πe = πT.
Now, however, a new problem arises. This is that a permanent demand shock
has no effect on output or inﬂation. This is because as can be seen from the IR
equation, rt rises by exactly the increase in rS,t. A rational central bank will raise
the interest rate by the full amount of any increase in the stabilising rate of interest
(assuming that πt = πT initially). Hence it at once eliminates any effect of the
5One possible way of circumventing problem 3 would be to assume α > 1/aγ. But this carries
another drawback from the point of view of realistic analysis, namely that adjustment to the equi-
librium cycles. The relevant difference equation is (πt+1 − πe) = (1 − αaγ)(πt − πe). Hence
stable non-cyclical adjustment requires 1 > (1 − αaγ) > 0 or 1/aγ > α, which implies that stable
non-cyclical adjustment to equilibrium is only consistent with π1 < πe.
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the model unrealistic for teaching undergraduates. This critique also applies to
supply shocks (shocks to ye), although it does not apply to inﬂation shocks.
2.4 The Walsh model (i = j = 0)
The Walsh model assumes i = j = 0, although it also assumes that the central
bank only learns of demand shocks, ut, in the next period. Because of this, the
Walsh model is not directly comparable with the other models purely in terms of a
different lag structure in the IS and PC equations. The Walsh equations are
xt = −a(rt − rS,t) + ut (IS equation)
πt = πt−1 + αxt. (PC equation)
If the central bank believes that ut+n = 0 for n ￿ 0, it will minimize the loss
function L = x2
t +β(πt−πT)2 subject to the Phillips curve πt = πt−1+αxt, which
implies as shown in Section 2.1, the MR–AD equation:
xt = −αβπt. (MR–AD equation)
Using a similar argument to that in Section 2.3, the interest rate rule is
rt − rS,t =
αβ
a
πt. (IR equation)
From a teaching perspective, the Walsh model produces a simple diagrammatic
apparatus, primarily in the Phillips diagram, and on similar lines to the R–T model,
with upward sloping Phillips curves and a downward sloping schedule relating out-
put to the rate of inﬂation. To derive the downward sloping curve, Walsh substitutes
the IR equation into the IS curve. This generates the following equation,
xt = −αβπt + ut, (MR–AD(W) equation)
which shows output to be determined jointly by monetary policy, −αβπt, and ex-
ogenous demand shocks, ut. To prevent confusion, we label this the MR–AD(W)
equation.
If the demand shock is permanent, the MR–AD(W) curve only shifts right by
ut in period t. In subsequent periods, t+n, n > 0, and assuming no further demand
shocks, the MR–AD(W) equation is simply xt+n = −αβπt+n. This is because the
stabilising rate of interest used by the central bank in period t does not take ut into
account, since ut is unknown to the central bank in period t. Once ut becomes
known in period t + 1, rS rises to its correct level and ut disappears. Because of
9
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target rate.
Drawbacks.
1. The ﬁrst drawback is that from a teaching point of view the economy is not
on the MR–AD(W) curve in period t when the shock occurs (contrary to the
way it is set out in Walsh). The reason is as follows: assume the economy
was in equilibrium in period t −1. Then the central bank will not change the
interest rate, r, in period t, since the central bank believes that nothing has
changed to disturb the equilibrium. The MR–AD(W) equation should really
be written as xt = −αβπCB
t +ut, since the monetary policy component of the
equation is equal to the level of output corresponding to the inﬂation rate the
central bank believes it is imposing, namely here πCB
t = πT = 0, so that the
x which the central bank believes it is producing is xCB
t = 0. Hence output
will increase by exactly ut, so that xt = xCB
t + ut = ut. Inﬂation in period t,
πt, is now determined by the intersection of the vertical line xt = ut and the
Phillips curve. In Fig. 2 this is shown as point A. Point B, the intersection of
the MR–AD(W) curve in period t and the Phillips curve in period t is never
reached. Note that B could only be reached if the central bank could reset
rt. But if the central bank could reset rt, it would now be able to work out
the value of ut so that instead of moving to B, it would adjust rS,t up to take
account of ut and hence go straight to Z, the equilibrium point.
2. The second problem is not an analytic one but a pedagogical one and relates
to the forward-looking way in which central banks function. We see this as
reﬂectingthequitelongtimelagsinthetransmissionofmonetarypolicy. This
is difﬁcult to capture in Walsh’s model since there are no lags: i = j = 0.
In our model, which we set out in the next sub-section, the rational central
bank is engaged in forecasting the future. How one teaches undergraduates
depends a lot on levels and background, but we have found it motivating for
themto put themselvesin the position ofacentral bank working outthefuture
impact of its current actions.
2.5 The C–S model (i = 1,j = 0)
The model we set out in detail in Section 3 of the paper is characterized by the lag
structure of i = 1 and j = 0, which implies that the the IS, PC and MR–AD
10
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Figure 2: The Walsh Model
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xt = −a(rt−1 − rS,t) (IS equation)
πt = πt−1 + αxt (PC equation)
xt+1 = −αβπt+1. (MR–AD equation)
The IR equation is derived from the MR–AD equation using the Phillips curve
equation to substitute for πt+1 and the IS equation to substitute for xt+1:
πt + αxt+1 = −
1
αβ
xt+1
πt = −
(1 + α2β)
αβ
xt+1
(rt − rS,t) =
αβ
a(1 + α2β)
πt. (IR equation)
We shall show that this model does not suffer the drawbacks of the R–T and
Walsh models. Irrespective of the kind of shock, inﬂation at the constant inﬂation
equilibrium is equal to target inﬂation.6 Moreover, aggregate demand and supply
shocks affect output and inﬂation and cannot be immediately offset by the central
bank. The C–S model incorporates central bank optimization, and enables students
to see that when the period t CB sets rt it is having to forecast how to achieve its
desired values of xt+1 and πt+1. In Svensson’s language it is setting rt in response
to current shocks to meet ‘forecast targets’. Moreover, as we shall see in Section
3, there is a simple diagrammatic apparatus that students can use to explore how a
wide variety of shocks and structural characteristics of the economy affect central
bank decision-making.
2.6 The Svensson–Ball model (i = 1,j = 1)
The Svensson–Ball model is the most realistic one, since its lag structure corre-
sponds most closely to the views of central banks. For example, the Bank of Eng-
land reports:
The empirical evidence is that on average it takes up to about one
year in this and other industrial economies for the response to a mon-
etary policy change to have its peak effect on demand and production,
and that it takes up to a further year for these activity changes to have
their fullest impact on the inﬂation rate.7
6We show in Section 4 how inﬂation bias arises if the central bank’s output target is above the
equilibrium, ye.
7Bank of England (1999), p. 9.
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PC and MR–AD equations in the Svensson–Ball model are:
xt = −a(rt−1 − rS,t) (IS equation)
πt = πt−1 + αxt−1 (PC equation)
xt+1 = −δαβπt+2. (MR–AD equation)
As we have seen, it is possible to derive an interest rate rule that expresses how
the central bank should react to current data. However, none of the lag structures
examined sofar deliversan interest rate equationthat takes the form of Taylor’s em-
pirical rule in which the central bank sets the interest rate in response to deviations
in both output and inﬂation from target. The lag structure in the Svensson–Ball
model produces an interest rate in the Taylor rule form:
xt+1 = −δαβπt+2
−a(rt − rS,t) = −δαβπt+1 − δα
2βxt+1
= −δαβπt − δα
2βxt + aδα
2β(rt − rS,t)
rt − rS,t =
δαβ
a(1 + δα2β)
(πt + αxt). (IR equation)
Hence the interest rate responds to current shocks to both output and inﬂation. In
Taylor’s empirical rule, the weights on both xt and πt are equal to 0.5: that will be
the case here if δ = α = β = a = 1.
In spite of the advantage of greater realism, introducing the second lag (j = 1)
to the C–S structure makes the diagrammatic analysis signiﬁcantly harder because
the Phillips curve has to be forecast a further period ahead. This does not pro-
vide corresponding gains for students in terms of the basic insights of central bank
behaviour.8
3 The C–S 3-equation model
In this section, we set out the C–S model to show how it can be taught to undergrad-
uates. We present the model in a format useful for teaching, i.e. with the periods
numbered zero and one and we work with output, y, rather than directly in terms of
the output gap, x. The key lags in the system that the central bank must take into ac-
count are shown in Fig. 3. In the IS curve, the choice of interest rate in period zero
will onlyaffectoutputnextperiod(i = 1) as it takestime forinterestrate changesto
feed through to expenditure decisions. In the Phillips curve, this period’s inﬂation
8The diagrams are set out in Carlin and Soskice (2006), Chapter 5.
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Figure 3: The lag structure in the C–S 3-equation model
isaffected by the current output gap (j = 0) and by last period’s inﬂation. The latter
assumption of inﬂation persistence can be justiﬁed in terms of lags in wage- and or
price-setting or by reference to backward-looking expectations: this assumption is
common to all the models considered. The lag structure of the model explains why
it is π1 and y1 that feature in the central bank’s loss function: by choosing r0, the
central bank determines y1, and y1 in turn determines π1. This is illustrated in Fig.
3.
3.1 Equations
The three equations of the 3-equation model, the IS equation (#1), the Phillips
curve equation (#2) and the MR–AD equation (#3), are set out in this section
before being shown in a diagram. The central bank’s problem-solving can be dis-
cussed intuitively and then depending on the audience, illustrated ﬁrst either using
the diagram or the algebra. The algebra is useful for pinning down exactly how the
problem is set up and solved whereas the diagrammatic approach is well-suited to
discussing different shocks and the path of adjustment to the new equilibrium.
The central bank minimizes a loss function, where the government requires it to
keep next period’s inﬂation close to the target whilst explicitly or implicitly requir-
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L = (y1 − ye)
2 + β(π1 − π
T)
2. (Central Bank loss function)
The critical parameter is β: β > 1 will characterize a central bank that places less
weight onoutput ﬂuctuations than on deviationsininﬂation, andvice versa. Amore
inﬂation-averse central bank is characterized by a higher β.
ThecentralbankoptimizesbyminimizingitslossfunctionsubjecttothePhillips
curve (j = 0):
π1 = π0 + α(y1 − ye). (Inertial Phillips curve: PC equation, #2)
By substituting the Phillips curve equation into the loss function and differentiating
with respect to y1 (which, as we have seen in Fig. 3, the central bank can choose by
setting r0), we have:
∂L
∂y1
= (y1 − ye) + αβ(π0 + α(y1 − ye) − π
T) = 0.
Substituting the Phillips curve back into this equation gives:
(y1 − ye) = −αβ(π1 − π
T). (Monetary rule: MR–AD equation, #3)
This equation is the equilibrium relationship between the inﬂation rate chosen in-
directly and the level of output chosen directly by the central bank to maximize its
utility given its preferences and the constraints it faces.
To ﬁnd out the interest rate that the central bank should set in the current period,
we need to introduce the IS equation. The central bank can set the nominal short-
term interest rate directly, and since implicitly at least the expected rate of inﬂation
is given in the short run, the central bank is assumed to be able to control the real
interestrateindirectly. TheIS equationincorporatesthelaggedeffectoftheinterest
rate on output (i = 1):
y1 = A − ar0 (IS equation, #1)
and in output gap form is:
y1 − ye = −a(r0 − rS). (IS equation, output gap form)
If we substitute for π1 using the Phillips curve in the MR–AD equation, we get
π0 + α(y1 − ye) − π
T = −
1
αβ
(y1 − ye)
π0 − π
T = −
￿
α +
1
αβ
￿
(y1 − ye),
15
Carlin and Soskice: The 3-Equation New Keynesian Model
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005and if we now substitute for (y1 − ye) using the IS equation, we get
(r0 − rS) =
αβ
a(1 + α2β)
￿
π0 − π
T￿
. (Interest rate rule, IR equation)
If a = α = β = 1,
(r0 − rS) = 0.5
￿
π0 − π
T￿
.
This tells the central bank how to adjust the interest rate (relative to the stabilizing
interest rate) in response to a deviation of inﬂation from its target.
By setting out the central bank’s problem in this way, we have identiﬁed the
key role of forecasting: the central bank must forecast the Phillips curve and the
IS curve it will face next period. Although the central bank observes the shock in
period zero and calculates its impact on current output and next period’s inﬂation,
it cannot offset the shock in the current period because of the lagged effect of the
interest rate on aggregate demand and output. This overcomes one of main draw-
backs of the optimizing version of the R–T model. We therefore have a 3-equation
model with an optimizing central bank in which IS shocks affect output.
3.2 Diagrams: the example of an IS shock
We shall now explain how the 3-equation model can be set out in a diagram. A
graphical approach is useful because it allows students to work through the fore-
casting exercise of the central bank and to follow the adjustment process as the
optimal monetary policy is implemented and the economy moves to the new equi-
librium.
The ﬁrst step is to present two of the equations of the 3-equation model. In the
lower part of the diagram, which we call the Phillips diagram, the vertical long-
run Phillips curve at the equilibrium output level, ye, is shown. We think of labour
and product markets as being imperfectly competitive sothatthe equilibriumoutput
leveliswherebothwage-andprice-settersmakenoattempttochangetheprevailing
real wage or relative prices. Each Phillips curve is indexed by the pre-existing or
inertial rate of inﬂation, πI = π−1.
As shown in Fig. 4, the economy is in a constant inﬂation equilibrium at the
output level of ye; inﬂation is constant at the target rate of πT = 2% and the real
interest rate required to ensure that aggregate demand is consistent with this level of
output is the stabilizing rate, rS. Fig. 4 shows the IS equation in the upper panel:
the stabilizing interest rate will produce a level of aggregate demand equal to equi-
librium output, ye. The interestrate axis in the IS diagram is labelled r−1 to capture
the lag structure in the IS equation. We now need to combine the three elements:
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Figure 4: IS and PC curves
the IS curve, the Phillips curve and the central bank’s forecasting exercise to show
how it formulates monetary policy.
In Fig. 5, we assume that as a consequence of an IS shock that shifts the IS
curve to IS′, the economy is at point A in the Phillips diagram with output above
equilibrium(at y0)andinﬂationofπ0 = 4%abovethe2%target. Thecentralbank’s
job is to set the interest rate, r0, in response to this new information about economic
conditions. Inorder to dothis, itmust ﬁrst make a forecastof the Phillipscurve next
period, since this shows the menu of output-inﬂation pairs that it can choose from
by setting the interest rate now: remember that changing the interest rate now only
affects output next period. Given that inﬂation is inertial, the central bank’s forecast
of the Phillips curve in period one will be PC(πI = 4) as shown by the dashed line
in the Phillips diagram. It is useful to note that the only points on this Phillips curve
with inﬂation below 4% entail lower output. This implies that disinﬂation will be
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disinﬂation.
How does the central bank make its choice from the combinations of inﬂation
and output along the forecast Phillips curve (PC(πI = 4))? Its choice will depend
on its preferences: the higher is β the more averse it is to inﬂation and the more it
will want to reduce inﬂation by choosing a larger negative output gap. We show in
the appendix how the central bank’s loss function can be represented graphically by
loss circles or ellipses and we refer to the relevant parts of these circles or ellipses
as its indifference curves. In Fig. 5, the central bank will choose point B at the
tangency between its indifference curve and the forecast Phillips curve: this implies
that its desired output level in period one is y1. This level of output is the central
bank’s aggregate demand target for period 1 as implied by the monetary rule. The
MR–AD line joins point B and the zero loss point at Z, where inﬂation is at target
and output is at equilibrium. The graphical construction of the downward sloping
MR–AD line follows naturally from the economic reasoning.
The fourth step is for the central bank to forecast the IS curve for period one.
In the example in Fig. 5, the forecast IS curve is shown by the dashed line and
labelled IS′. With this IS curve, if an interest rate of r′
0 is set in period zero, the
level of output in period one will be y1 as desired. Of course other random shocks
maydisturbthe economyinperiod1butsince these are bydeﬁnitionunforecastable
by the central bank, they do not enter its decision rule in period zero.
To complete the example, we trace through the adjustment process. Following
the increase in the interest rate, output falls to y1 and inﬂation falls to π1. The
central bank forecasts the new Phillips curve, which goes through point C in the
Phillips diagram (not shown) and it will follow the same steps to adjust the interest
rate downwards so as to guide the economy along the IS′ curve from C′ to Z′.
Eventually, the objective of inﬂation at πT = 2% is achieved and the economy is at
equilibrium output, where it will remain until a new shock or policy change arises.
The MR–AD line shows the optimal inﬂation-output choices of the central bank,
given the Phillips curve constraint that it faces.
An important pedagogical question is the name to give the monetary rule equa-
tion when we show it in the Phillips diagram. What it tells the central bank at t = 0
is the output level that it needs to achieve in t = 1 if it is to minimize the loss func-
tion, given the forecast Phillips curve. Since we are explaining the model from the
central bank’s viewpoint at t = 0, what we want to convey is that the downward-
sloping line in the Phillips diagram shows the aggregate demand target at t = 1
implied by the monetary rule. We therefore use the label MR–AD.9
9It would be misleading to label it AD thus implying that it is the actual AD curve in the
Phillips diagram because the actual AD curve will include any aggregate demand shock in t = 1.
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gram because the essence of the monetary rule is to identify the central bank’s best
policy response to any shock. Both the central bank’s preferences shown graph-
ically by its indifference curves and the Phillips curve trade-off it faces between
output and inﬂation appear in the Phillips diagram. Once the central bank has cal-
culated its desired output response byusing the forecast Phillipscurve, it is straight-
forward to go to the IS diagram and discover what interest rate must be set in order
to achieve this level of aggregate demand and output.
3.3 Using the graphical model
We now look at a variety of shocks so as to illustrate the role the following six
elements play in their transmission and hence in the deliberations of policy-makers
in the central bank:
1. the inﬂation target, πT
2. the central bank’s preferences, β
3. the slope of the Phillips curve, α
4. the interest sensitivity of aggregate demand, a
5. the equilibrium level of output, ye
6. the stabilizing interest rate, rS.
A temporary aggregate demand shock is a one-period shift in the IS curve,
whereas a permanent aggregate demand shock shifts the IS curve and hence rS,
the stabilizing interest rate, permanently. An inﬂation shock is a temporary (one-
period) shift in the short-run Phillips curve. This is sometimes referred to as a
temporary aggregate supply shock. An aggregate supply shock refers to a perma-
nent shift in the equilibrium level of output, ye. This shifts the long-run vertical
Phillips curve.
If aggregate demand shocks in t = 1 are included, the curve ceases to be the curve on which the
central bank bases its monetary policy in t = 0. On the other hand if an aggregate demand shock
in t = 1 is excluded — so that the central bank can base monetary policy on the curve — then it
is misleading to call it the AD schedule; students would not unreasonably be surprised if an AD
schedule did not shift in response to an AD shock.
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In Section 3.2 and Fig. 5 we analyzed an IS shock — but was it a temporary or a
permanent one? In order for the central bank to make its forecast of the IS curve, it
hastodecide whetherthe shockthatinitiallycaused output to rise toy0 is temporary
or permanent. In our example, the central bank took the view that the shock would
persist for another period, so it was necessary to raise the interest rate to r′
0 above
the new stabilizing interest rate, r′
S. Had the central bank forecast that the IS curve
would revert to the pre-shock IS curve, then it would have raised the interest rate
by less since the stabilizing interest rate would have remained unchanged at rS.
The chosen interest rate would have been on the IS curve labelled pre-shock at the
output level of y1 (see Fig. 5).
3.3.2 Supply shock
One of the key tasks of a basic macroeconomic model is to help illuminate how the
main variables are correlated following different kinds of shocks. We can appraise
the usefulness of the IS-PC-MR model in this respect by looking at a positive ag-
gregate supply shock and comparing the optimal response of the central bank and
hence the output and inﬂation correlations with those associated with an aggre-
gate demand shock. A supply shock results in a change in equilibrium output and
therefore a shift in the long-run Phillips curve. It can arise from changes that af-
fect wage- or price-setting behaviour such as a structural change in wage-setting
arrangements, a change in taxation or in unemployment beneﬁts or in the strength
of product market competition, which alters the mark-up.
Fig. 6 shows the analysis of a positive supply-side shock, which raises equilib-
rium output from ye to y′
e. Before analyzing the impact of the shock and the adjust-
ment process as the central bank works out and implements its optimal response,
it is useful to identify the characteristics of the new constant-inﬂation equilibrium.
In the new equilibrium, equilibrium output will be at the new higher level, y′
e, and
inﬂation will be at its target of 2%. The long-run Phillips curve will be at y′
e. There
will a new MR–AD curve, MR–AD′, since it must go through the inﬂation target
and the new equilibrium output level, y′
e: the zero loss point for the central bank
following this shock is at point Z. Note also that as a consequence of the supply
shock, the stabilizing interest rate has fallen to r′
S.
Wenowexaminetheinitialeffectoftheshock. Sincethelong-runPhillipscurve
shifts to the right so too does the short-run Phillips curve corresponding to inﬂation
equal to the target (shown by the PC(πI = 2,y′
e)). The ﬁrst consequence of the
supply shock is a fall in inﬂation (from 2% to zero) as the economy goes from A
to B, with output remaining unchanged at ye: this is observed by the central bank
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this, we follow the same steps taken in Section 3.2. The central bank forecasts the
Phillips curve constraint (PC(πI = 0,y′
e)) for period one and chooses its optimal
level of output as shown by point C. Next the central bank must forecast the IS
curve: since there is no information to suggest any shift in the IS curve, it is as-
sumed ﬁxed. To raise output to the level desired, the central bank must therefore
cut the interest rate in period zero to r′ as shown in the IS diagram. Note that since
the stabilizing interest rate has fallen to r′
S, the central bank reduces the interest rate
below this in order to achieve its desired output level of y′. The economy is then
guided along the MR–AD′ curve to the new equilibrium at Z.
The positive supply shock is associated initially with a fall in inﬂation, in con-
trast to the initial rise in both output and inﬂation in response to the positive ag-
gregate demand shock. In the aggregate demand case, the central bank has to push
output below equilibrium during the adjustment process in order to squeeze the
higher inﬂation caused by the demand shock out of the economy. Conversely in
the aggregate supply shock case, a period of output above equilibrium is needed in
order to bring inﬂation back up to the target from below. In the new equilibrium,
output is higher than its initial level in the supply shock case whereas it returns to
its initial level in the case of the aggregate demand shock. In the new equilibrium,
inﬂation is at target in both cases. However, whereas the real interest rate is higher
thanitsinitiallevelinthenewequilibriumfollowingapermanentpositiveaggregate
demand shock, it is lower following a positive aggregate supply shock.
3.3.3 IS shock: the role of the interest-sensitivity of aggregate demand
In the next experiment (Fig. 7), we keep the supply side of the economy and the
central bank’s preferences ﬁxed and examine how the central bank’s response to
a permanent aggregate demand shock is affected by the sensitivity of aggregate
demand to the interest rate. It is assumed that the economy starts off with output at
equilibrium and inﬂation at the target rate of 2%. The economy is at A′ in the IS
diagram and at A in the Phillips diagram. The equilibrium is disturbed by a positive
aggregate demand shock such as improved buoyancy of consumer expectations,
which is assumed by the central bank to be permanent. Two post-shock IS curves
are shown in the upper panel of Fig. 7: the more interest sensitive one is the ﬂatter
onelabelledIS′′. Topreventthediagramfromgettingtoocluttered,onlythesteeper
of the two pre-shock IS curves is shown.
The step-by-step analysis of the impact of the shock is the same as in Section
3.2. The consequence of output at y′ above ye is that inﬂation rises above target
— in this case to 4% (point B). To calculate its desired output level, the central
bank forecasts the Phillips curve (i.e. PC(πI = 4)) along which it must choose
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tral bank’s preferences are assumed to be identical for each economy, the Phillips
diagram and hence the PC and MR–AD curves are common to both. However,
in the next step, the structural difference between the two economies is relevant.
By going vertically up to the IS diagram, we can see that the central bank must
raise the interest rate by less in response to the shock (i.e. to r′′ rather than to r′) if
aggregate demand is more responsive to a change in the interest rate (as illustrated
by the ﬂatter IS curve, IS′′).
3.3.4 How central bank inﬂation aversion and the slope of the Phillips curve
affect interest rate decisions
To investigate how structural features of the economy such as the degree of inﬂa-
tionaversionofthecentralbankandtheresponsivenessofinﬂationtotheoutputgap
impinge on the central bank’s interest rate decision, we look at the central bank’s
response to an inﬂation shock. A one-period shift in the Phillips curve could occur
as a result, for example, of an agricultural disease outbreak that temporarily inter-
rupts supply and pushes inﬂation above the target level. We assume the economy
is initially in equilibrium with output of ye and inﬂation at the central bank’s target
rate of 2%. This is shown by point A in each panel of Fig. 8. To prevent cluttering
the diagrams, the initial short-run Phillips curve is only shown in Fig. 8(a). The
economy experiences a sudden rise in inﬂation to 4%. The short-run Phillips curve
shifts to PC(πI = 4%) and the economy moves to point B in Fig. 8.
In our ﬁrst example in Fig. 8(a), we focus attention on the consequences for
monetary policy of different degrees of inﬂation aversion on the part of the central
bank (β): the other ﬁve structural characteristics listed at the beginning of Section
3.3are held constant. FromtheMR–AD equation(i.e. (y1−ye) = −αβ.(π1−πT))
and from the geometry in Fig. 11 in the appendix, it is clear that if the indifference
curves are circles (i.e. β = 1) and if the Phillips curve has a gradient of one (i.e.
α = 1), the MR–AD line is downward sloping with a gradient of minus one. It
followsthattheMR–AD linewillbeﬂatter thanthisiftheweightoninﬂationinthe
central bank’s loss function is greater than one (β > 1). The more inﬂation-averse
central bank is represented by the solid MR–AD′ line in Fig. 8(a). In response to
the inﬂation shock, the more inﬂation-averse central bank wishes to reduce inﬂation
by more and will therefore choose a larger output reduction: point D as compared
with point C for the less inﬂation-averse central bank.
We turn to the second example in Fig. 8(b). In this case, we hold the central
bank’s preferences constant (β = 1, so in geometric terms, the central bank in-
difference curves are circles) and look at the implications of the responsiveness of
inﬂation to output as reﬂected in the slope of the Phillips curve. The economy with
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curve: this is the solid one labelled MR–AD′. As in Fig. 8(a), the inﬂation shock
shifts the short run Phillips curve upwards and takes the economy from point A to
point B on the long-run Phillips curve. When α = 1 (i.e. with the dashed Phillips
curve and MR–AD curve), the central bank’s optimal point is C, whereas we can
see that if the Phillips curve is steeper, the central bank cuts aggregate demand by
less (point D). The intuition behind this result is that a steeper Phillips curve means
that, holding central bank preferences constant, it has to ‘do less’ in response to a
given inﬂation shock since inﬂation will respond sharply to the fall in output asso-
ciated with tighter monetary policy.
Using the diagram underlines the fact that although the MR–AD curve is ﬂatter
in both of our experiments, i.e. with a more inﬂation-averse central bank or with
greater sensitivity of inﬂation to output, the central bank’s reaction to a given inﬂa-
tion shock is different. In the left hand panel, the ﬂatter MR–AD curve is due to
greater inﬂation-aversion on the part of the central bank. Such a central bank will
always wish to cut output by more in response to a given inﬂation shock (choosing
point D) as compared with the neutral case of β = 1 (where point C will be cho-
sen). By contrast in the right hand panel, a central bank facing a more responsive
supply-side (as reﬂected in steeper Phillips curves) will normally choose to do less
in response to an inﬂation shock (choosing point D) than would a central bank with
the same preferences facing a less responsive supply-side (point C).
The examples in Fig. 8(b) andFig. 7 highlight thatif we hold the central bank’s
preferences constant, common shocks will require different optimal responses from
the central bank if the parameters α (reﬂected in the slope of the short run Phillips
curve)ora(reﬂectedintheslope of the IS curve)differ. Thisisrelevanttothecom-
parison of interest rate rules across countries and to the analysis of monetary policy
in a common currency area. For example in a monetary union, unless the aggregate
supply and demand characteristics thatdetermine the slope of the Phillipscurve and
the IS curve in each of the member countries are the same, the currency union’s
interest rate response to a common shock will not be optimal for all members.
3.4 Lags and the Taylor rule
ATaylorrule isa policyrulethattellsthecentralbankhowtosetthecurrentinterest
rate in response to shocks that result in deviations of inﬂation from target or output
fromequilibriumor both. In Section2.1, we used the expressioninterestrate rule or
IR equation to refer to the Taylor-type rules derived from each model. In Taylor’s
original empirical rule, (r0 − rS) responds to (π0 − πT) and (y0 − ye) with the
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r0 − rS = 0.5(π0 − π
T) + 0.5(y0 − ye). (Taylor rule)
We derived the Taylor-type rule for the 3-equation C–S model:
(r0 − rS) =
αβ
a(1 + α2β)
￿
π0 − π
T￿
, (IR equation, C–S model)
which with a = α = β = 1, gives r0 − rS = 0.5(π0 − πT). Two things are
immediatelyapparent: ﬁrst, onlytheinﬂationandnotthe outputdeviationispresent
inthe rule although the centralbank caresaboutboth inﬂation and output deviations
as shown by its loss function. Second, as we have seen in the earlier examples, all
the parameters of the three equation model matter for the central bank’s optimal
response to a rise in inﬂation. If each parameter is equal to one, the weight on the
inﬂation deviation is one half. For a given deviation of inﬂation from target, and in
each case, comparing the situation with that in which a = α = β = 1, we have
• a more inﬂation averse central bank (β > 1) will raise the interest rate by
more;
• when the IS is ﬂatter (a > 1), the central bank will raise the interest rate by
less;
• when the Phillips curve is steeper (α > 1), the central bank will raise the
interest rate by less.10
As shown in the discussion of the Svensson–Ball model in Section 2, in order to
derive a Taylor rule in which both inﬂation and output deviations are present, it is
necessary to modify the lag structure of the three equation C–S model. Speciﬁcally,
it is necessary to introduce an additional lag (j = 1), i.e. the output level y0 affects
inﬂation a period later, π1. This means that it is y0 and not y1 that is in the Phillips
curve for π1.
ThedoublelagstructureisshowninFig. 9andhighlightsthefactthatadecision
taken today by the central bank to react to a shock will only affect the inﬂation rate
two periods later, i.e. π2. When the economy is disturbed in the current period
(period zero), the central bank looks ahead to the implications for inﬂation and sets
the interest rate r0 so as to determine y1, which in turn determines the desired value
of π2. As the diagram illustrates, action by the central bank in the current period
has no effect on output or inﬂation in the current period or on inﬂation in a year’s
time.
10This is always true for β = 1 (as in the right hand panel of Fig. 8). In fact, with β ≥ 1, the
output cut in response to a given inﬂation shock is always less when α > 1 as compared with α = 1.
For β < 1, the output cut is less as long as α > 1/β.
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Figure 9: Double lag structure in the 3-equation model (i = j = 1)
Given the double lag (i = j = 1), the central bank’s loss function contains y1
and π2 since it is these two variables it can choose through its interest rate deci-
sion:11
L = (y1 − ye)
2 + β(π2 − π
T)
2
and the three equations are:
π1 = π0 + α(y0 − ye) (Phillips curve)
y1 − ye = −a(r0 − rS) (IS )
π2 − π
T = −
1
αβ
(y1 − ye). (MR–AD)
By repeating the same steps as we used in Section 2.1, we derive the interest rate
rule:
(r0 − rS) =
αβ
a(1 + α2β)
￿￿
π0 − π
T￿
+ α(y0 − ye)
￿
.
(Interest rate (Taylor) rule in 3-equation (double lag) model)
11For clarity when teaching, it is probably sensible to ignore the discount factor, i.e. we assume
δ = 1.
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(r0 − rS) = 0.5
￿
π0 − π
T￿
+ 0.5(y0 − ye).
Implicitly the interest rate rule incorporates changes in the interest rate that
are required as a result of a change in the stabilizing interest rate (in the case of
a permanent shift in the IS or of a supply-side shift): rS in the rule should be
interpreted as the post-shock stabilizing interest rate.
It is often said that the relative weights on output and inﬂation in a Taylor rule
reﬂect the central bank’s preferences for reducing inﬂation as compared to output
deviations. However, we have already seen in the single lag version of the model
that although the central bank cares about both inﬂation and output deviations, only
the inﬂation deviation appears in the interest rate rule. Although both the output
and inﬂation deviations are present in the IR equation for the double lag model,
the relative weights on inﬂation and output depend only on α, the slope of the
Phillips curve. The relative weights are used only to forecast next period’s inﬂation.
The central bank’s preferences determine the interest rate response to next period’s
inﬂation (as embodied in the slope of the MR curve). Another way to express this
result is to say that the output term only appears in the IR equation because of the
lag from a change in output to a change in inﬂation, i.e. because j = 1.
4 Inﬂation bias and time inconsistency
4.1 Introducing inﬂation bias
In the 3-equation models analyzed to this point (with the exception of the R–T
model without an optimizing central bank), medium-run equilibrium is character-
ized by inﬂation equal to the central bank’s inﬂation target and by output at equilib-
rium. However, since imperfect competition in product and labour markets implies
that ye is less than the competitive full-employment level of output, the government
may have a higher target output level. We assume that the government can impose
this target on the central bank. How do things change if the central bank’s target is
full-employment output, or more generally a level of output above ye? For clarity,
we use the C–S model (i = 1,j = 0).
A starting point is to look at the central bank’s new objective function. It now
wants to minimize
L = (y1 − y
T)
2 + β(π1 − π
T)
2, (1)
where yT > ye. This is subject as before to the Phillips curve,
π1 = π0 + α.(y1 − ye). (2)
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Figure 10: Inﬂation Bias
In Fig. 10 the central bank’s ideal point is now point A (where y = yT and π = πT)
rather than where y = ye and π = πT (i.e. point C). Since nothing has changed on
the supply side of the economy, the Phillips curves remain unchanged. To work out
the central bank’s monetary rule, consider the level of output it chooses if πI = 2%.
Fig. 10 shows the Phillips curve corresponding to πI = 2%. The tangency of
PC(πI = 2) with the central bank’s indifference curve shows where the central
bank’s loss is minimized (point D). Since the central bank’s monetary rule must
also pass through A, it is the downward sloping line MR–AD in Fig. 10.
We can see immediately that the government’s target, point A, does not lie on
the Phillips curve for inertial inﬂation equal to the target rate of πT = 2%: the
economy will only be in equilibrium with constant inﬂation at point B. This is
where the monetary rule (MR–AD) intersects the vertical Phillips curve at y = ye.
At point B, inﬂation is above the target and the gap between the target rate of
inﬂation and inﬂation in the equilibrium is the inﬂation bias.
We shall now pin down the source of inﬂation bias and the determinants of its
size. We begin by showing why the equilibrium is at point B. If the economy is
initially at point C with output at equilibrium and inﬂation at its target rate of 2%,
the central bank chooses its preferred point on the PC(πI = 2) and the economy
would move to point D (see Fig. 10). With output above equilibrium, inﬂation goes
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Phillips curve in Fig. 10). The process of adjustment continues until point B is
reached: output is at the equilibrium and inﬂation does not change so the Phillips
curve remains ﬁxed. Neither the central bank nor price- or wage-setters have any
incentive to change their behaviour. The economy is in equilibrium. But neither
inﬂation nor output are at the central bank’s target levels (see Fig. 10). Inﬂation
bias arises because target output is above ye: in equilibrium, the economy must be
at the output level ye and on the MR–AD curve. It is evident from the geometry
that a steeper MR-AD line will produce a larger inﬂation bias.
We can derive the same result using the equations. Minimising the central
bank’s loss function (equation (1)) subject to the Phillips curve (equation (2)) im-
plies
y1 − y
T + αβ(π0 + α(y1 − ye) − π
T) = y1 − y
T + αβ(π1 − π
T)
= 0.
So the new monetary rule is:
y1 − y
T = −αβ(π1 − π
T). (MR–AD equation)
This equation indeed goes through (πT,yT). Since from the Phillips curve, we have
π0 = π1 when y1 = ye, it follows that
ye = y
T − αβ(π0 − π
T)
⇒ π = π
T +
(yT − ye)
αβ
inﬂation bias
. (Inﬂation bias)
In equilibrium, inﬂation will exceed the target by
(yT−ye)
αβ , the inﬂation bias.12 The
signiﬁcance of this result is that π > πT whenever yT > ye. In other words, it is
the fact that the central bank’s output target is higher than equilibrium output that
is at the root of the inﬂation bias problem. Inﬂation bias will be greater, the less
inﬂation-averse it is; i.e. the lower is β. A lower α also raises inﬂation bias. A
lower α implies that inﬂation is less responsive to changes in output. Therefore,
any given reduction in inﬂation is more expensive in lost output; so in cost-beneﬁt
terms for the central bank, it pays to allow a little more inﬂation and a little less
output loss.
12For an early model of inﬂation bias with backward-looking inﬂation expectations, see Phelps
(1967).
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The problem of inﬂation bias is usually discussed in conjunction with the problem
of time inconsistency in which the central bank or the government announces one
policy but has an incentive to do otherwise. For this kind of behaviour to arise, it
is necessary to introduce forward-looking inﬂation expectations. The simplest as-
sumption to make is that inﬂation expectations are formed rationally and that there
is no inﬂation inertia: i.e. πE = E[π], so π = πE + εt, where εt is uncorrelated
with πE. We continue to assume that the central bank chooses y (and hence π) after
private sector agents have chosen πE. This deﬁnes the central bank as acting with
discretion. Now, in order for ﬁrms and workers to have correct inﬂation expecta-
tions, they must choose πE such that it pays the central bank to choose y = ye. That
must be where the central bank’s monetary rule cuts the y = ye vertical line, i.e. at
point B in Fig. 10. Note that the positively sloped lines are now interpreted as Lu-
cas supply equations rather than as short-run Phillips curves.13 This is the so-called
Lucas surprise supply equation:
yt − ye =
1
α
￿
πt − π
E
t
￿
yt = ye +
1
α
￿
πt − π
E
t
￿
inﬂation surprise
.
For an expectations equilibrium, inﬂation must be sufﬁciently high to remove
the temptation of the central bank to raise output toward its target. With π = 4%
and y = ye, the temptation has been removed because any increase in output from
B would put the central bank on a loss circle more distant from its bliss point A:
ﬁrms and workers therefore rationally expect an inﬂation surprise of 2% over and
above the target inﬂation rate of 2% (compare point B, which is an expectations
equilibrium for the private sector and the central bank, with point C, which is not
an equilibrium for the central bank).
Inﬂation bias presents a problem. As is clear from Fig. 10, the loss to the
central bank at B is greater than its loss at C, since output is the same but inﬂation
is higher at B. So the central bank would clearly be better off at C. Moreover, ﬁrms
and workers would be just as happy at C as at B, since output, employment and
the real wage are the same in each case. What is to stop the central bank being at
C? When private sector agents are forward-looking, the problem is called that of
time inconsistency. Although the central bank claims to have an inﬂation target of
13The usual interpretation of the former is that an inﬂation surprise leads output to deviate from
equilibrium whereas in the latter, a shift of output away from the equilibrium leads inﬂation to
deviate from its expected level.
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the interest rate, the central bank does not choose the output level consistent with
its target. In short, at point B there is no incentive for the central bank to cheat;
whereas at point C, there is an incentive.
5 Conclusions
In Section 2 we showed how different versions of a simpliﬁed 3-equation New Key-
nesianmodelwere generatedbythe absence or presence oftwo criticaltime-lags—
from the interest rate to output (i = 0 or 1) and from output to inﬂation (j = 0 or 1).
Thus the simple Romer–Taylor model has i = 0 and j = 1; Walsh has i = j = 0
and Svensson–Ball has i = j = 1. Our preferred model for teaching purposes
(C–S) has i = 1 and j = 0. The paper develops this model graphically as a replac-
ment for the standard IS-LM-AS model. It provides undergraduate students and
non-specialists with the tools for analyzing a wide range of macroeconomic distur-
bances and with access to contemporary debates in the more specialized monetary
macroeconomics literature. It has a number of features that distinguish it from
other models that replace the LM equation with a monetary policy rule. First, it
conforms with the view that monetary policy is conducted by optimizing forward-
looking central banks. Second, since aggregate demand responds to interest rate
changes with a lag, aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks cannot be fully
offset even by a forward-looking central bank. Third, in response to a shock, the
central bank guides the economy back to equilibrium with target inﬂation.
The graphical approach helps illuminate the role played by structural character-
istics of the aggregate supply and demand sides of the economy and by the central
bank’s preferences in determining the optimal interest rate response to shocks. It
is straightforward to demonstrate the determinants of the size of the inﬂation bias
using this model and the origin of the time inconsistency problem.
The model brings to the fore the relationship between the central bank’s pref-
erences and the form of the interest rate rule. In the C–S model, the interest rate
rule shows the interest rate responding to current deviations of inﬂation from tar-
get. An advantage of the model is that, modiﬁed with an additional lag it becomes
the Svensson-Ball model. In that case, the response of inﬂation to output is lagged
and the central bank must forecast the Phillips curve a further period ahead, which
produces an interest rate rule that takes the familiar Taylor rule form to include con-
temporaneous inﬂation and output shocks. Although we believe the Svensson–Ball
model is too complex to use as an undergraduate teaching model, it will be useful
for students to see the relationship between the two, and hence a derivation of the
standard Taylor rule.
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Figure 11: Central bank loss function: varying the degree of inﬂation aversion
6 Appendix
The central bank’s loss function: graphical representation
The geometry of the central bank’s loss function can be shown in the Phillips
diagram. The loss function with i = 1,j = 0, i.e.
L = (y1 − ye)
2 + β(π1 − π
T)
2,
is simple to draw. With β = 1, each indifference curve is a circle with (ye,πT) at its
centre (see Fig. 11(a)). The loss declines as the circle gets smaller. When π = πT
and y = ye, the circle shrinks to a single point (called the ‘bliss point’) and the loss
is zero. With β = 1, the central bank is indifferent between inﬂation 1% above (or
below) πT and output 1% below (or above) ye. They are on the same loss circle.
Only when β = 1, do we have indifference circles. If β > 1, the central bank is
indifferent between(say) inﬂation1% above (or below) πT and output 2% above (or
below) ye. This makes the indifference curves ellipsoid as in Fig. 11(b). A central
bank with less aversion to inﬂation (β < 1) will have ellipsoid indifference curves
with a vertical rather than a horizontal orientation (Fig. 11(c)). In that case, the
indifference curves are steep indicating that the central bank is only willing to trade
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Such a central bank is sometimes referred to as unemployment-averse.
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